



The debate about divine action
Theological cosmology – usually expressed in terms of the doctrine of 
creation – has often been divorced in our thinking from the cosmology 
of the scientist. It has also been divorced from our understanding of 
incarnation and salvation. In this paper I outline my attempt over a 
number of years to bring these aspects of our thinking into a fuller 
relationship with each other. I have done this, as the reader will see, by 
combining insights from two very different sources. The first of these 
is the Eastern Orthodox tradition, in which the theology of creation 
is strongly linked to an understanding of incarnation. The second is 
the tendency towards philosophical naturalism, which – largely due to 
liberal Protestant influence – has been a characteristic feature of the 
modern science-theology dialogue.
Until relatively recently, this science-theology dialogue had, for 
several decades, been dominated by questions about divine action. 
Participants in the dialogue not only rejected the notion that science 
and theology are to be seen as either in conflict or else as independent 
of one another. They also felt a need to move away from conventional 
supernaturalism and to stress the naturalistic perspectives provided 
by science. Most of them did this, however, in the context of an 
attempt to defend more than the notion of ‘general’ divine action 
that occurs through the normal, natural functioning of the cosmos, 
and which requires simply God’s benevolent design of the cosmos’s 
entities and laws of nature. They also attempted to defend the notion 
of ‘special’ divine action, assuming that Christianity is necessarily 
based on a notion of God ‘responding’ to situations in the world. They 
did this, not in terms of the notion of supernatural divine intervention 
– as had previously been usual – but rather by attempting to develop 




responses to the world without suspending the laws of nature and 
acting purely supernaturally. 
Behind this quest lay a reaction against the notion that God’s action 
should be identified with events for which no scientific explanation 
seemed possible. This focus on ‘gaps’ in scientific understanding – 
common in an earlier period – was in part a reflection of the deism of 
the eighteenth century, which had urged that the ‘clockwork’ universe 
posited by Newtonian physics had no need for God except as its designer 
and initiator. There were two places where gaps in explanation seemed 
evident. One was in events deemed to be miraculous. The other was 
in the universe’s apparent design, which even the deists (who denied 
the occurrence of miracles) acknowledged as good evidence for the 
existence of at least some kind of God. 
In terms of this eighteenth and early nineteenth century ‘God of 
the gaps’ understanding, the kind of apologetic argument that was 
based on the world’s apparent design seemed to many to be one of 
the main grounds on which theistic belief could be rationally held. 
One of the classic expressions of this belief was that of William Paley, 
who argued that if you found a watch, then even if you didn’t know 
what it was for, its intricate design would indicate to you that it had 
been designed and made by an intelligent watchmaker. In the same 
way, he argued, the intricate interconnectedness of things in the world 
pointed to the existence of God as a kind of cosmic watchmaker. The 
influence of this argument was such that when Darwin’s theory of 
evolution proved able to provide a naturalistic explanation for much 
of the biosphere’s supposed design, there was something of a crisis 
among theistic believers. Indeed, this crisis still goes on among 
supporters of the ‘Intelligent Design’ movement. These insist – in a 
way that has proved unpersuasive to most scientists – that the current 
understanding of evolution as the ‘blind watchmaker’ is scientifically 
unsound.
God’s immanence
Early theological responses to Darwin were, however, less uniformly 
antagonistic than is often supposed. In particular, in 1889 there was 
a robust defence of the Darwinian scheme by Aubrey Moore, the 
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argument of which was to be of considerable importance to the later 
science-theology dialogue. What Moore pointed out was that the 
commonly-held view of God’s creative action as a series of ‘special’ 
acts had a major theological flaw. The Darwinian view, he argued, 
should be seen as ‘infinitely more Christian than the theory of “special 
creation.” For it implies the immanence of God in nature, and the 
omnipresence of his creative power.’ Those, he went on, who oppose 
‘the doctrine of evolution in defence of “a continued intervention” 
of God, seem to have failed to notice that a theory of occasional 
intervention implies as its correlative a theory of ordinary absence.’2
It is a reaction against this ‘ordinary absence’ of the ‘God of the 
gaps’ that has characterised much of the mainstream science-theology 
dialogue of our time. If we look at the work of the three main figures 
who in the late twentieth century dominated that dialogue – Ian 
Barbour, Arthur Peacocke and John Polkinghorne – we find that each 
(albeit in a slightly different way) has defended the notion that God 
always works ‘in, with, and under the laws of nature’. 
However, none of these three gave up the notion that – in addition 
to the general providence provided by a world that develops through 
naturalistic processes – there occur events that need some notion of 
‘special divine action’ to account for them. Rejecting the old notion of 
‘supernatural intervention’, they and their more recent followers have 
tried to find plausible ways in which God can respond to events in the 
world without setting aside the laws of nature. In this search they have 
focused on the way in which the world, as the scientist now perceives 
it, is not the deterministic one described by Newtonian physics but 
the non-deterministic one described by quantum physics. This has led 
them to believe that some sort of ‘causal joint’ is possible, through 
which God can influence the outcome of the laws of nature without 
setting those laws aside. Some have seen quantum indeterminacy as 
important in this; others have seen this view as inadequate and have 
posited other candidates for the location of the causal joint.
However, none of these schemes is truly ‘noninterventionist’ in the 
way that is sometimes claimed, since any event that God brings about, 
through one or other of the ‘causal joints’ that are postulated, must 
be the result of a decision by God to ‘interfere’ with the usual range 
of possible natural outcomes to that situation, choosing one rather 
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than any of the others. What is envisaged is therefore merely a rather 
more subtle kind of interference with the world than that envisaged by 
those who once talked about ‘supernatural intervention’. Moreover, 
the causal joint approach is unable to give any account of what is 
sometimes called ‘the instrumental substructure of God’s acts’ – the 
chain of events that leads from God’s basic action to the event that is 
identified as God’s providential aim. 
In addition to these issues there are a number of others – identified 
in an important study by Nicholas Saunders3 – that lead him to conclude 
that ‘the prospects for supporting anything like the “traditional 
understanding” of God’s activity in the world are extremely bleak’, 
so that it is ‘no real exaggeration to say that contemporary theology 
is in crisis.’4 My only disagreement with Saunders in this assessment 
is that I believe that his notion of the ‘traditional understanding’ of 
God’s action is too narrow, since it is focused on supposedly biblical 
perspectives rather than on the Christian tradition as a whole. Here I 
agree with Wesley Wildman’s judgment that much of the support for 
the ‘causal joint’ account of special divine action comes from what he 
calls a ‘personalistic theism’ that represents ‘a distinctively Protestant 
deviation from the mainstream Christian view’.5 Because of this, I 
have argued that part of our strategy in trying to re-think divine action 
must be to re-assess traditional Christian understandings, and this is 
indeed part of the approach of my book, The God of Nature,6 on which 
this essay is based. An equally important part of my argument in that 
book is, however, my exploration of the way in which the naturalism 
at the heart of the scientific enterprise can be interpreted in a theistic 
way, and it is with this that I shall begin here.
Strong theistic naturalism
There have been some – Arthur Peacocke in particular – who have 
described themselves as ‘theistic naturalists’ because – although they 
adopt a causal joint explanation of special divine action – they put a 
great deal of stress on naturalistic perspectives. This approach I have 
dubbed ‘weak theistic naturalism’7 in order to distinguish it from the 
‘strong theistic naturalism’ that I have myself defended, in which it is 
held that there are no events that result from God’s temporal response 
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to situations or events. (This was, of course, precisely the position 
taken by the deists, but deism is by no means the only form of strong 
theistic naturalism. My own view, as we shall see, differs from deism 
in several crucial ways.)
If we ask defenders of special divine action why they are wary of 
strong theistic naturalism, two issues tend to predominate. One is that 
there is a perceived need for God to ‘guide’ the development of a world 
in which chance mechanisms seem to entail a basic unpredictability 
about outcomes. Here, they often take up the view of biological 
evolution associated with the name of Stephen Jay Gould, which 
stresses the unpredictability of the evolutionary process. In response 
to this argument, I have urged that we need to recognize that this view 
is not held throughout the biological community. Richard Dawkins, 
for example, has noted that certain functional attributes – such as the 
eye, the venomous sting, and echolocation – have actually appeared 
independently a number of times in the course of evolution. He suggests 
that if we did a systematic count of such independent origins we would 
find ‘certain potential evolutionary pathways which life is “eager” to 
go down […] Evolution repeatedly races down the easy corridors, and 
just occasionally, and unexpectedly, leaps one of the hard barriers.’8 
In this sense, Dawkins seems to imply that evolution does have a 
degree of predictability. An even stronger, quasi-teleological version 
of this position has, moreover, been taken by Simon Conway Morris, 
who has speculated that ‘an exploration of how evolution “navigates” 
to particular functional solutions may provide the basis for a more 
general theory of biology’. It is his suspicion, he says, ‘that such a 
research programme might reveal a deeper fabric to biology in which 
Darwinian evolution remains central as the agency, but the nodes of 
occupation are effectively pre-determined from the Big Bang’.9
If the issue of unpredictability in evolution is by no means as 
strong an argument as it seems to be to some who want to insist that 
special divine action must occur, neither is their argument about 
the theological necessity of positing a particular kind of ‘personal’ 
God who can ‘respond’ to intercessory prayer and other events in 
the world. In particular, I have argued that their implicit or explicit 
assumption of God as a temporal being entirely ignores what has been 
called the classical notion of divine eternity, in which the effectiveness 
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of intercessory prayer can be defended without recourse to a ‘temporal 
response’ understanding.10 I have also urged that any panentheistic 
approach – in which the world is seen, not as separated from God 
but as in some sense ‘in God’ – will counter their argument that only 
a personalistic theism can avoid the tendency of a strong theistic 
naturalism towards the ‘absentee landlord’ God of deism. After all, I 
have observed, if it is the case that God is in everything and everything 
is in God, then God can hardly be absent from the world. (As we shall 
see, the Eastern Orthodox understanding is strongly panentheistic 
because of its Christological interpretation of the created order.)
In addition, I have argued that even if we insist that some kind of 
temporal, personal God is intrinsic to Christian belief, it is important to 
recognize that personal actions can, philosophically, be ‘naturalistic’ 
in the sense that they do not need a separate decision and new action 
on each occasion. The example I have given11 is the human providence 
that is involved in parents’ financial support of their children when the 
latter are students at university. In practice, this is likely to involve 
the human equivalents of both general and special divine action, so 
that, for example, I might say to my son: ‘The money that comes 
regularly from my bank account to yours by standing order – my 
general providence – wasn’t designed to cover car repairs but only 
normal, everyday expenses. Here, therefore, is some extra cash – 
special providence – to cover the repairs your car needs.’ In principle, 
however, the ‘special’ providence required as a response to something 
out of the ordinary, like these car repairs, is only the result of my lack 
of wisdom in predicting possible eventualities. My financial provision 
could, at least in principle, be purely of the ‘general providence’ kind, 
enacted through a number of ‘if-then’ statements added to my standing 
order to the bank. Thus the standing order might take this form: 
‘Transfer such and such an amount every month to my son’s account, 
to cover his everyday expenses, and if he provides receipts for repairs 
to his car, then transfer to his account enough additional funds to cover 
those repairs.’ My payment of my son’s car repair bill through this 
mechanism would be no less ‘personal’ than if I had handed him the 
cash directly, but no new decision or action on my part would have 
been necessary. If humans can in principle (though probably not in 
practice) be wise enough to avoid the necessity of special action in 
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response to events, it is surely wrong to deny predictive wisdom of 
this kind to God.
In addition to this kind of philosophical argument, I have urged 
another in relation to another objection to strong theistic naturalism 
that is sometimes offered in defence of special divine action. This is 
related to the Christian belief in the occurrence of those events usually 
deemed miraculous. While naturalism of any kind is often seen as 
precluding the occurrence of such events, this view is, I have suggested, 
a flawed one, based on an unnecessary definition of miracles as events 
in which the laws of nature are violated.12 Such events, I have urged, 
are unusual, not because of violation of natural laws, but because they 
constitute the result of the kind of ‘higher’ laws of nature that seem to 
have been envisaged in Augustine of Hippo’s discussion of miracles,13 
which require special circumstances for their effects to be tangible. In 
this sense, I have argued, they are comparable to changes in regime of 
the kind known to physicists, such as the onset of superconductivity. 
(We may nowadays, I have suggested, wish to express this Augustinian 
insight in terms of emergent phenomena comparable to such regime 
change phenomena, of the kind explored in this context by John 
Polkinghorne.14 Alternatively, we might perhaps talk in terms of 
instantiations of new laws of nature, of the kind explored in relation 
to Christ’s resurrection by Robert John Russell.)15 It is in this sense 
of allowing for the possibility of ‘miraculous’ events that I have 
described my version of naturalism as enhanced naturalism. 
Traditional perspectives
My arguments about the possibilities inherent in strong theistic 
naturalism also have their echoes in ancient Christian thinking about 
incarnation and salvation. This is especially true of the Eastern 
Orthodox tradition, which rejects the Augustinian separation between 
grace and nature that has influenced most Western theological systems. 
In this Eastern tradition, as Vladimir Lossky has noted, there is no 
concept ‘of “pure nature” to which grace is added as a supernatural 
gift. For it, there is no natural or “normal” state, since grace is implied 
by the act of creation itself.’16 This is linked to the way in which the 
Western notion of the supernatural is only rarely used in Orthodoxy, 
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since this notion depends on a notion of the separation of grace and 
nature that is alien to Orthodox thinking.17
The panentheistic dimension of this understanding is manifested 
particularly in the work of a patristic author who is extremely 
influential in modern Orthodox thinking: Maximos (or Maximus) the 
Confessor (d. 662). In a way that reflects the range of meanings of the 
Greek term logos, Maximos speaks, not only about the divine Logos 
incarnate in Christ (John 1:1–14), but also about the logos of each 
created thing, which he sees as being in some sense a manifestation 
of the divine Logos. (It is in this way that the notions of creation and 
incarnation are intimately linked in Orthodox thinking. The created 
world is interpreted not just theistically but Christologically, in a way 
that goes far beyond most Western notions of the ‘cosmic Christ’.) One 
modern Western scholar, Lars Thunberg, has gone as far as to say that 
for Maximos there is ‘almost a gradual incarnation’,18 and although 
this expression is imprecise, it is valid insofar as it points to the link in 
Orthodox thinking between the act of creation and the incarnation in 
Christ. Nor is this link simply a peculiarity of the Orthodox tradition, 
since modern Western exegesis of the fourth gospel’s use of the Logos 
concept also has a strong sense that the incarnation in Christ is not so 
much a supernatural intrusion into the cosmos as the completion of a 
process begun in the act of creation.19
An important point to note here is that Maximos’s notion of the 
logos of each created thing seems to anticipate the kinds of teleological 
possibilities which, as we have noted, are implicit in Simon Conway 
Morris’s analysis of evolutionary theory (and are also implicit in 
some understandings of the ‘fine-tuning’ of the universe perceptible 
to astrophysicists, and usually explored at a philosophical level in 
terms of what is called the anthropic cosmological principle).20 As one 
scholar has put it, for Maximos’s understanding ‘Christ the creator 
Logos has implanted in every created thing a characteristic logos, a 
“thought” or “word,” which is God’s intention for that thing, its inner 
essence, that which makes it distinctively itself and at the same time 
draws it toward the divine realm.’21 Or, as another has put it, the world, 
‘created in order that it might be deified, is dynamic, tending always 
towards its final end’.22
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There is also in this Eastern Christian tradition something that 
seems to echo the Augustinian notion of miracles being the result of 
the operation of ‘higher laws of nature’. This is related to the belief 
that the ‘natural’ world has suffered a transformation in ‘the Fall’ (not 
necessarily interpreted as a historical event)23 and will undergo another 
transformation when its eschatological fulfilment is accomplished. 
In this sense, as Panayiotis Nellas has pointed out, the world as we 
experience it is seen in Orthodox theology as being far from what God 
originally intended and ultimately wills, so that in a sense it should be 
seen as ‘unnatural’24 or – perhaps better – subnatural. The traditional 
Eastern interpretation of the ‘garments of skin’ given by God to 
Adam and Eve after their disobedience (Genesis 3:21) is that they 
represent our present, sub-natural, psychosomatic make-up, and that 
this make-up is reflected in the entire sub-natural world in which we 
find ourselves. (An aspect of this sub-natural character of the world is 
that there exists within it what Western Christian analysis would call 
‘natural evil’.) Miracles, for this Eastern tradition, are often seen as a 
restoration of the world’s ‘natural’ state – i.e. as an anticipation of its 
eschatological transformation.25
The central argument in my book, The God of Nature, is that my 
philosophical arguments about strong theistic naturalism and these 
essentially theological insights may be brought together in a new 
synthesis, in which the distinction between special and general divine 
action is made redundant. This argument is, as the reader might expect, 
not a simple one of the kind that can be presented here in detail, and 
those interested must, therefore, be referred to that book. Two things 
that have happened since its publication may, however, be helpful to 
those who read it now. 
The first of these is that there has been – from within the 
Roman Catholic tradition – a revision by Michael Dodds of much 
of scholasticism’s metaphysics in relation to divine action.26 This 
revision manifests clear links to aspects of my own approach. The 
second is that Sarah Lane Ritchie has pointed out that not only are 
there links between Dodds’s work and my own, but also significant 
links between these and an essentially new strand of thinking within 
Protestantism.
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The ‘theological turn’ in the divine action debate
Ritchie – one of the most able of the younger generation of science-
religion researchers, and now a lecturer in the University of 
Edinburgh – has spoken about what she calls a ‘theological turn’ in 
the debate about divine action. In this development, she observes, the 
metaphysical basis of the causal joint model is radically challenged. In 
her influential paper on this topic27 (to be expanded in a forthcoming 
book)28 Ritchie has explored the way in which the proponents of 
the theological turn challenge the causal joint model’s assumption 
of an essentially autonomous universe that God must influence 
from ‘outside’. The challengers instead posit, in their various ways, 
a universe that is to be understood only in terms of God’s presence 
within it. They argue, she observes, 
that standard causal joint proposals […] are dependent upon 
question-begging metaphysical commitments, which in turn 
inadequately frame the entire divine action conversation. These 
presuppositions involve basic ontological questions about the 
God-nature relationship, and especially the question of what, 
exactly, it means to be properly “natural.”29
Ritchie points not only to my own work and that of Dodds, but 
also towards the work of two scholars in the charismatic/Pentecostal 
tradition: Amos Yong30 and James K. A. Smith.31 She observes that 
– like my own panentheistic framework and like Dodds’ Thomistic 
approach – the ‘pneumatological naturalism’ of these two scholars 
reverses the standard methodology of standard divine action 
theories. Smith, she notes, labels his own version of this perspective 
as enchanted naturalism, and this is similar, she observes, to the 
understandings to be found in Dodds’ approach and in my own work. 
(It is a coincidence – but surely a significant one – that Smith’s term 
enchanted naturalism is echoed by my own use of the term enhanced 
naturalism.) 
This kind of pneumatological framework for divine action is able, 
in Ritchie’s judgment, to perform the same metaphysical function as 
panentheism does in my own approach. In all of these approaches, 
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she observes, to be natural is to be fundamentally involved with 
God at the most basic level. One aspect of this parallelism relates to 
the basic understanding of nature. Just as for Orthodoxy there is no 
‘pure’ nature to which grace is added as a supernatural gift, so also 
the pneumatologists ‘deny the implicit deism that would legitimize 
the notion of an autonomous natural world apart from the Spirit of 
God.’32 Another similarity lies in the understanding of miracles. As 
we have seen, miraculous events are, for my own approach, an aspect 
of the ‘natural’ functioning of the world. In a comparable way, the 
pneumatological approach is, as Ritchie observes, one in which, 
if ‘some events seem more supernatural than others, this is due to 
varying levels of creaturely response and openness to the Spirit’.33 
Such events are, she goes on (quoting Smith), ‘sped-up modes of 
the Spirit’s more regular presences’.34 This clearly parallels my own 
view of the way that such events may be seen as the outcome of the 
presence of the Logos in both ordinary and ‘higher’ laws of nature. 
(In Yong’s approach to this issue there is also, it should be noted, an 
eschatological focus comparable to my own, though Ritchie does not 
comment on this.)
An important aspect of this Pentecostal/charismatic emphasis on 
the third person of the Trinity is that it may be seen as complementing 
the Orthodox focus on the second person – especially when we 
remember that pneumatological insights are already implicitly present 
in the Orthodox approach, since Orthodoxy has a strong sense of the 
importance of the Cappadocian Fathers’ belief that all divine action is 
essentially Trinitarian action, with the Son and the Spirit constituting 
what Irenaeus called the ‘two hands’ of the Father. The way in which 
the Spirit’s role is made explicit in the pneumatological naturalism of 
Yong and Smith arguably clarifies my own Logos-focused naturalism 
in a way that can enable an understanding of divine action to be 
developed that is truly Trinitarian (and not just based on the rather 
vague philosophical theism of the causal joint approach.) 
A theology of the world’s faiths
There is an aspect of this new understanding of naturalism and 
divine action that has not been commented on by any of the authors 
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involved in the ‘theological turn’ other than myself. This relates to its 
possible implications for developing a theology of the world’s faith 
traditions. My approach here is based at least partly on the way in 
which theologians like Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar have 
explored the psychological, visionary aspect of revelatory experience. 
What I have added to this kind of analysis is an interpretation based 
on the general model of divine action that I have developed, so that a 
particular focus on naturalistic processes is central to the proposals I 
have made.
These proposals were originally expressed in terms of a specifically 
Christian perspective,35 and it was only later that I clarified those 
aspects of my approach that could be used from the perspective of 
any faith tradition. This was done in terms of five theses, which I first 
set out in 2010 in an analysis of the concept of homo religiosus,36 and 
subsequently reiterated in a 2013 article, in which they were linked 
to the insights of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin.37 The five theses are as 
follows:
1. The human psyche may be understood in principle entirely in 
terms of the development of the cosmos through natural processes 
from the Big Bang to the evolutionary emergence of specifically 
human qualities. All experiences that give the impression of being 
revelatory of a divine reality are the spontaneous, natural products 
of the human psyche, and do not require any notion of ‘special’ 
divine action to explain them.
2. These experiences are culturally-conditioned, in that their specific 
forms will relate to both the individual psychological make-up 
and culturally-determined expectations of those who receive them. 
These factors are sufficient to explain why, in different individuals 
and cultural contexts, there is considerable diversity in the types 
of such experience and of the religious languages that arise from 
them.
3. The belief of most religious people, that their faith’s foundational 
religious experiences have given rise to a religious language that 
is genuinely referential to a divine reality, is a valid one. This 
divine reality – as something to which reference can validly be 
made – is therefore ontologically defensible.
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4. The diversity of the religious languages that arise from different 
revelatory experiences does not imply that they cannot all validly 
refer to the divine reality. A pluralistic understanding of their 
referential success is possible.
5. The cosmos, in which the revelation-oriented human psyche has 
arisen naturalistically, is attributable to the ‘will’ or character of 
the divine reality to which authentic revelatory experience bears 
witness. (As those of the Abrahamic traditions might put it, the 
probability that some creatures would come to know their creator 
was built into the cosmos, by that creator, from the very beginning.)
Behind these five theses lies the notion of what – by analogy with 
ecological niches – I have called the psycho-cultural niches within 
which revelatory experiences arise. As I put it in the first book in 
which I explored this concept, the core of this idea is that 
just as life is potentially multiform, and will arise and develop 
new forms ‘spontaneously’ through natural (chemical and 
biological) processes in accordance with the possibilities 
inherent in a given ecological environment, so revelation 
– psychological in mechanism, but also in part genuinely 
referential – is also potentially multiform. It too will arise 
and develop new forms ‘spontaneously’ through natural 
(psychological) processes, in accordance with the possibilities 
inherent in a given cultural and psychological environment. 
Whether we are considering life or revelation, however, neither 
spontaneity nor naturalness precludes a theological explanation 
in terms of divine action through the sacramental potential of 
the cosmos.38
Pansacramentalism
The term sacramental potential used here is, in fact, at the heart of 
my whole approach, since this potential relates not simply to the 
sacraments of the Church – though it takes its initial bearings from 
those sacraments – but to a more general understanding of the nature 
of all created things. An embryonic version of this pansacramentalism 
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(as I have called it) is arguably to be found in Quakerism (which does 
not have specific ecclesiastical sacraments), and is certainly to be 
found in strands of Anglicanism (which does). It is this underdeveloped 
Anglican form that seems to have informed the approach to the 
science-theology dialogue of Arthur Peacocke, for whom 
it looks as though Christians, starting, as it were, from one end 
of their experience of God in Christ through the Holy Spirit 
acting in the stuff of the world, have developed an insight into 
matter which is consonant with that which is now evoked by 
the scientific perspective working from matter towards persons, 
and beyond.39 
For Orthodox, however, a more fully-developed kind of 
pansacramentalism is often quasi-instinctive. Moreover, as Philip 
Sherrard has argued, the form it takes in their tradition cuts the Gordian 
knot of wrangles about how many sacraments there are and about the 
validity or otherwise of divisive terms like transubstantiation. The 
basis of such wrangles may be seen, he argues, as missing the essential 
point about what a sacrament is.40 For him, ‘what is indicated or 
revealed in the sacrament is something universal, the intrinsic sanctity 
or spirituality of all things, what one might call their real nature’.41
For another Orthodox author, Alexander Schmemann, sacraments 
are, in a similar way, quite simply, ‘a revelation of the genuine nature 
of creation’.42 And it is essentially this vision of the genuine nature of 
creation that has given rise to all that I have written in this essay and 
elsewhere about the direction in which theological cosmology should 
go. Whether it is an authentic vision or otherwise is for the reader to 
judge. 
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